Resilient Dynamic Data Driven Application Systems (rDDDAS)  by Dsouza, Glynis et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  18 ( 2013 )  1929 – 1938 
1877-0509 © 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Selection and peer review under responsibility of the organizers of the 2013 International Conference on Computational Science
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2013.05.362 
2013 International Conference on Computational Science
Resilient Dynamic Data Driven Application Systems (rDDDAS)
Glynis Dsouza a, Salim Hariri a, Youssif Al-Nashif a, Gabriel Rodriguez b
aNSF Center for Cloud and Autonomic Computing ,The University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721 ,USA.
b Computer Architecture Group,University of A Coruña,Campus de Elviña, s/n 15071 A Coruña,Spain.
Abstract
There is a growing interest in Cloud Computing for delivering computing as a utility. Security in Cloud 
Computing is a challenging research problem because it involves many interdependent tasks including 
vulnerability scanning, application layer firewalls, configuration management, alert monitoring and analysis,
source code analysis, and user identity management. It is widely accepted that we cannot build software and
computing systems that are free from vulnerabilities and cannot be penetrated or attacked. Consequently, there 
is a strong interest in resilience approach because of its potential to address the cybersecurity challenges. Our 
is based on using the Dynamic Data Driven Application System (DDDAS) and Moving Target Defence (MTD)
strategies to develop resilient DDDAS. The Resilient Applications utilize the following capabilities: Software
Behaviour Encryption (SBE), Replication, Diversity, Automated Checkpointing and Recovery. Software
Behaviour Encryption employs spatiotemporal behaviour encryption and a moving target defence to make
active software components change their implementations and their resources randomly and consequently 
evade attackers. Diversity and random execution is achieved b -
equivalent, behaviourally-different software versions at runtime (This encryption of the execution environment 
will make it extremely difficult for an attack to disrupt the normal operations of a cloud application. Also, the 
dynamic change in the execution environment will hide the software flaws that would otherwise be exploited
by a cyberattacker. Checkpointing is used to save the current state of the task to a reliable storage and thus
enabling rollback recovery if it is required to tolerate cyberattacks and mitigate their impacts. We use the
Compiler for Portable Checkpointing (CPPC), a tool for automatically inserting portable checkpoints into the
code.
We also evaluate the performance and overhead of running three applications in our rDDDAS environment.
Our experimental results show that the rDDDAS environment can be used to develop resilient cloud 
applications are resilient against attacks with around 7% in execution time overhead.
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1. Introduction 
Cloud systems and their ubiquitous penetration in our daily life increase the need for their services to be secure 
and resilient to cyber attacks and/or malicious faults.  It has been noted that much of the vulnerability in 
computing systems can be attributed to the monoculture [1] or lack of diversity in software systems. It is 
practically inevitable that software will contain flaws. Current software monoculture enables attacks to spread 
rapidly and thus exposing the systems to large-scale attacks by well-informed attackers. Inspired by the 
resilience of diverse biological systems, our approach is based on a diversity-based defense mechanism against 
software attacks that utilizes spatiotemporal software diversity to enhance software system security, 
survivability and resilience. 
 
Moving Target Defense has been identified as a game changer approach to build self-defending systems [2]. 
Some works presented a wide range of Moving target Defense (MTD) techniques to continuously change 
network configurations or parameters, firewall settings, operating systems, memory addresses, instruction sets, 
or application execution environments [3][4].  For example, in [3], the IP addresses are dynamically changed 
while maintaining existing connections. One can also randomize the configuration space [5] where the 
configuration variables of a system are randomized, while ensuring the availability of end to end services. 
 
In [6], the authors presented a survey of several software fault tolerance techniques. The fault tolerance 
techniques that are based on diversity include dual-node redundant operating stations with hardware or 
software result comparison [10], Recovery Block Station [8], Distributed Recovery Block with acceptance Test 
[9], Voting Triple Modular Redundant Computing Stations [10] and N version programming [11]. Also, the 
authors in [12] have described several diversity defense techniques used in popular operating systems. These 
include Address Space Randomization [13], Instruction Set Randomization [14], and Data Randomization [15]. 
In our approach, we adopt diversity technique to the application execution environment, redundancy in the 
resources used to run the cloud services and randomly changing the versions and resources used to make it 
prohibitively expensive for attackers to figure our current execution environment and succeeding in exploiting 
vulnerabilities and launching attacks. 
2. Resilient DDDAS Environment  
Our approach aims at leveraging a 
closed loop DDDAS-based architecture to 
develop resilient applications that will 
prohibitively increase the burden on the 
adversary to penetrate and exploit cloud 
vulnerabilities. Our architecture is shown 
in Figure 1 and has the following 
components: Replication, Diversity and 
Automatic Checkpointing, Software 
Behavior Encryption (SBE) and the 
Decision Support System (DSS).  In the 
following section, we briefly highlight the 
main tasks performed by each of the units shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Architectural Components 
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2.1. Replication
The concept of design diversity is commonly used in software fault tolerance techniques [16] in order to 
continue to operate successfully in spite of software design faults. In our rDDDAS approach, we combine the 
N-version programming [11] and online anomaly behavior analysis techniques. Hardware redundancy is
applied by having the task run on different physical nodes in the cloud infrastructure. Each of these physical 
nodes is designated as a replica..
2.2. Software Behavior Encryption
SBE adopts a Moving Target Defense (MTD) strategy by using spatiotemporal behavior encryption to make
active software components change their implementation versions and resources continuously and 
-equivalent,
behaviorally-different software versions (code implementation) at runtime (e.g., each software task can have
multiple versions, where each version can be a different algorithm implemented in different programming
language running on different computing systems). This approach will make it extremely difficult for an attack 
to disrupt the normal operations of a cloud application or service. Also, by incorporating the DDDAS
paradigm [24], the feedback we receive from top or bottom layers will be used to adopt the resilience level by 
dynamically changing shuffling policies, increasing or decreasing the shuffling rate, and scope of executing
change in the execution environment will hide the software flaws that would otherwise be exploited by a
cyberattacker.
2.3. Decision Support System (DSS)
The primary task of the DSS is to support dynamic
decisions among the various components based on the 
DDDAS paradigm such that the cloud resources and
services are dynamically configured to effectively exploit 
the current state of the cloud system and meet the
application security requirements that might change at 
runtime.
Figure 2 shows how the DSS component applies an 
acceptance test to task A with three replicas between the
output of phase i and the input of phase i+1. The   
acceptance test will determine which output of the three
replicas will be used as the input of the next phase for all
the replicas. The Automatic Checkpointing unit 
continuously collects checkpoint information from the versions on each replica.
To reduce the recovery time to tolerate software attacks or compromised tasks, a switching element data
structure (see Figure 2) is used to connect the output of the task operating normally (this could  be taken from 
any of the replicas) to the next stage, and so on. If no attack is detected, the switching elements will be setup to
select the first results that are determined to be operating normally as shown in Figure 2. However, if after the
acceptance test has determined that a replica, say replica1 is determined to be compromised, the switching
module will be setup by DSS, t
Figure 2: DSS Acceptance Test
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the other replica module for Task A to the next phase.  It is clear from this example that the design diversity
will enable cyber resources and applications to continue to operate normally in spite of attacks on the tasks and 
their execution environments. 
2.4. Diversity and Automatic Checkpointing
This component is responsible for generating the functionally equivalent-behaviorally different versions
required by the SBE. We use the Compiler for Portable Checkpointing for continuously capturing the current 
state of the system.
3. Software Behavior Encryption
The Software Behavior Encryption (SBE) algorithm encrypts the execution environment by dynamically 
changing the sequence of execution of task variants by shuffling the task variant running after each execution 
phase. The dynamic software behavior change makes it more difficult for an attacker to generate a profile with 
the possible flaws of the executing variant (task versions). The decisions regarding when to shuffle the current 
variant, the shuffling frequency, and the variant selection for the next shuffle are guided by a continuous
feedback from the autonomic and
program manager.  
The SBE module will continuously 
and randomly change execution 
environment of each
task by adjusting the shuffling
(changing) cycle, the adversary will
not have enough time to figure out the
existing vulnerability and the
execution environment. Any attack 
will go through at least three phases:
probing, constructing and launching
phases. If the environment stays static
as it is now, the attacker has plenty of 
time to identify existing vulnerabilities
that can be exploited. However, if the
life cycle for any version is much shorter that the time it takes the attacker to launch the attack (see Figure 3) as 
it will be the case using our SBE algorithm, the attacker will not be able to succeed in exploiting any existing
vulnerabilities in cloud services. Hence, the cloud services will be resilient to cyberattacks and continue to
operate normally or with acceptable degraded performance. 
3.1. Overview
The dynamic software behavior change makes it more difficult for an attacker to generate a profile with the
possible flaws of the executing version (task versions).  SBE induces diffusion by running the task versions on 
different physical and logical resources (Linux, Windows, different libraries and file systems, etc.).The 
Figure 3:The attacker can succeed if the version execution tie is smaller than the 
time to probe, construct and launch an attack
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decisions regarding when to shuffle the current version, the shuffling frequency, and the version selection for 
the next shuffle guided by the decision support system component.
Figure 4 shows an example on how SBE can be
implemented to encrypt the execution of one task 
(Task A) with three consecutive phases. During
phase 1, we execute version 3 of Task A , version
1 during Phase 2, and version 1 during Phase 3.
Each phase ends at the expiration of a timer. At
the end of each phase, the current state of the
execution is stored as a checkpoint as described in
section 2. This checkpoint is passed onto the DSS
component to perform the anomaly analysis using
acceptance testing techniques.
3.2. Autonomic Management (Self- Management)
The Self Management (SM) architecture is based on our autonomic computing environment (Autonomia) [17].
The SM main functions implemented in two software modules (see Figure 5): Observer and Controller 
modules. The Observer module monitors
and analyzes the current state of the
managed cloud resources or services.
The Controller module is delegated to
manage the cloud applications and enforce
the resilient operational policies. In fact,
the Observer and Controller pair provides a
unified management interface to support 
-management services by
continuously monitoring and analyzing 
current cloud system conditions in order to
select the appropriate plan to correct or 
remove anomalous conditions once they are detected and/or predicted.
4. Experimental Evaluation
4.1. rDDDAS Environment
To evaluate our rDDAS approach, we have implemented a test-bed based on the IBM BladeCenter HS22
Private Cloud [18
implementation runs on a three node cluster where each is hosting two virtual machines. One of these virtual
machines is Windows based, while the other is Linux based.
Figure 5:Self Management Architecture
Figure 4: SBE Example for a task with three phases
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Figure 6 shows our 
implementation 
approach for the
rDDAS using multi-
core cloud system. 
The N version
paradigm [11] is 
applied at both the 
task level and the 
supervisory level.
Each physical node
constitutes a replica.
On each replica,
Application level
Diversity is applied
by having different 
versions of a 
program on different 
virtual machines. In 
what follows, we describe our experimental environment and the applications used for testing and evaluation of 
rDDDAS.
4.2. Experimental Results
Figure 7 illustrates the setup used in our
experiment. In the beginning, the SBE
controller randomly selects a supervisor 
from a set of three supervisors (one
supervisor on each physical node). This
supervisor then randomly selects a phase
timer for that phase. The master machines
on each physical node randomly select the
version to be run on each node.
Checkpoints are continuously stored on a 
master machine on each physical node. At
the expiration of the phase timer, the last
checkpoint from each of the three masters is passed onto the supervisor machine (Steps 12-15 in the algorithm 
shown in Figure 10). An Acceptance test is run on each of these checkpoints. This test checks the following: a)
The solution is within a range, b) The memory utilization of the program is within a normal range, and c) The
variable values after subsequent iterations are not too divergent. The latest checkpoint that passes the
acceptance test is selected as the output of this phase. For example, if the checkpoints received from the
masters have completed iteration 5, 7 and 8, respectively and they all pass the acceptance test, then the
checkpoint which has completed the 8th iteration is selected as the output for this stage and the input for the
Figure 7: Experimental Setup
Figure 6: r-DDDAS Implementation on an IBM Blade system
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next phase (Steps 16-21 in Figure 10). At the beginning of the next stage, a new supervisor is selected 
randomly and the above process is repeated 
until the final output is received. 
 
 
4.2.1 MiBench Benchmarks 
The MiBench Benchmarks [19] consist of C 
programs from six categories each targeting a 
specific area of the embedded market. We used 
the Basicmath program from the Automotive 
and Industrial category. We calculated the 
overhead of our rDDDAS architecture for 
different number of iterations of this 
benchmark. The results are presented in Figure 
8. As seen in the figure, the overhead of our 
algorithm decreases as program size increases.  
 
4.2.2 Jacobi based Linear Equation Solver 
 
Linear equations are used to solve a wide range 
of real world scientific and engineering problems. 
The Jacobi technique [7] is an iterative technique 
for solving a set of linear equations under two 
assumptions: 
 The system given by Ax=B has a unique 
solution 
 The co-efficient matrix A has no zeroes 
on its diagonal. 
 
To solve a set of n equations, we solve the first 
equation for x1, second equation for x2 as shown in Figure 9. 
 
We first make an initial assumption of the 
values of x. We then substitute these values into 
the right hand side of the above set of equations. 
This completes the first iteration. Thereafter, we 
recalculate the values of x using the above 
calculated values. These calculations are repeated 
in subsequent iterations until a convergence is 
reached. 
The Jacobi Algorithm described above has 
been implemented in C, C++ and Fortran, thus 
creating versions [See Figure 13 ]. We applied the 
algorithm shown in Figure 10. Figure 12 
summarizes the overhead in terms of the 
execution time and overhead percentage for five 
programs with a normal execution time ranging 
 
 
Figure 8: Overhead for SBE with three phases 
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Figure 10: SBE Algorithm used in our experiment 
 
 
Figure 9: Linear Equation Solver using Jacobi's iteration method 
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Figure 13: Versions used for Linear Equation Solver
from 200 seconds to 3600
seconds, respectively. The
overhead is given as a
function of the number of 
phases selected to run the
application. We calculated
the overhead as the
additional time taken with
our algorithm compared to 
running the application
without SBE. As shown in 
Figure 12, for programs
with higher execution times,
the overhead due to SBE 
reduces significantly. For 
example, for a program with 
execution time of 3600 seconds, the overhead percentage for 3 phases is 7%. The number of phases to run each 
application can be chosen such that it meets the performance and resilient requirements of the application. The
DDDAS paradigm will be used to select these parameters at runtime.
In evaluating the resilience of this
application, the following attack 
scenarios are launched against the 
application execution. Figure 11
illustrates Scenario 1:
1. DoS Attack (Attack Scenario
1).  We launched a DoS attack on the
Windows machine running version V1
during Phase 2 using the mprime library
for memory DoS attack [Error!
Reference source not found.. As a 
result of DoS attack, V1 run was very 
slow. The DSS detected that the
checkpoints received from the other two
versions were faster and accurate.
Hence the checkpoint from the other
machine was selected as the output of 
this stage and the application continues
to operate normally in spite of DoS attack.
2. Insider Attack (Attack Scenario 2). As
shown in Figure 7 there are three
supervisors that directly communicate
gFi ure 11: Scenario 1
Figure 12: Overhead
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with the SBE Controller. Only one is randomly selected as the active supervisor in any given phase. In Scenario 
2, in the beginning of the execution, we compromised Supervisor 2 by destroying all the Supervisor services 
running on it. During the phase when Supervisor 2 was selected, the acceptance test unit on the controller 
detected that the Supervisor code is not running and it consequently selected another Supervisor.   
 
4.2.3 MapReduce 
 
     We have also evaluated our approach using a MapReduce application [21] which uses a parallel data    
processing model to solve a wide range of large-scale computing problems. The implementation of the 
Map/Reduce cloud application consists of three physical machines hosting two virtual machines each. Oracle 
Virtualbox [22] has been used as the virtualization software. The MapReduce word count program [21] is 
available on each virtual machine.  
 
We evaluated the resilience of the above approach against DoS attack and Insider attacks on one physical 
machine at a time. The resilient MapReduce application was able to tolerate these attacks and continue to 
operate normally. The average response time using this algorithm increases by 14% (without attack) and 24% 
(with attack). For more information on this work, please refer to [23]. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we discussed the need for resilient cloud techniques because we cannot develop cloud 
applications that cannot be penetrated or attacked. We presented closed loop Resilient Dynamic Data Driven 
Applications (rDDDAS) architecture and showed how to implement it using four functions: Replication, 
Software Behaviour Encryption (SBE), Decision Support System and Diversity and Automatic Checkpointing. 
SBE employs multidimensional software diversity and moving target defense strategies to make it extremely 
difficult to the attackers to figure out the execution environment and exploits its vulnerabilities. We have 
evaluated the performance of the rDDDAS approach to provide resilient operations to three cloud applications. 
We also showed that our approach can tolerate external and insider attacks with low overhead. 
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